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DIRECT DEMOCRACY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE?
I.

Introduction
In December of 2021, I had the opportunity to travel with the University of Chicago Law

School on the International Immersion Program (IIP) trip to Switzerland.1 The Program is
designed to provide law students with a substantive immersive international experience. My
experience on the trip in conjunction with a seminar offered at the Law School called Law &
Political Economy sparked my interest in popular sovereignty and, in particular, direct
democracy.2 Switzerland, of course, is a model of direct democracy and understanding their
system of democracy was a core aspect of our Program.
In our seminar, we debated the merits of the practical monopoly the Supreme Court has
on Constitutional change in the United States, which was presented in Aziz Rana’s Who Owns
the Constitutions?.3 Rana agreed with the 1912 Socialist Party platform that not only did the text
of the constitution need to be changed, but the “way that Americans imagined what defined a
constitution and thus what constitutional politics looked like had to shift.”4 The main alternative
to the Supreme Court as the driver of constitutional change is the formal power to amend the
Constitution in Article 5 which is vested with Congress and State Legislatures. The Constitution

1

See Students Travel to Switzerland and Denmark through Law School’s International Immersion Program, The
University of Chicago Law School, https://www.law.uchicago.edu/slideshows/students-travel-switzerland-anddenmark-through-law-schools-international-immersion
2
Law & Political Economy scholars “believe that developments over the last several decades in legal scholarship
and policy helped to facilitate rising inequality and precarity, political alienation, the entrenchment of racial
hierarchies and intersectional exploitation, and ecological and social catastrophe.” ABOUT, The Law and Political
Economy Project (last visited Apr. 27, 2022), https://lpeproject.org/about/
3
See Aziz Rana, Who Owns the Constitution?, Jacobin (Oct. 15, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/10/usconstitution-law-supreme-court-socialism. (“Scholars widely describe the United States as the country with the
single most difficult amendment process globally, given the need for two-thirds support in both houses of Congress
and then three-fourths of the states to ratify. The result is that amendments are practically a dead letter.
Constitutional change in this country is driven instead by judicial interpretation…”).
4
See Id.
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has come under fire in the 21st Century due to the tumultuous political culture in the United
States leading to many reform proposals to renew our Constitutional amendment process.5
Rana concludes that “we should assess reform ideas through the lens of bargaining
power, considering what each proposal would mean for the everyday institutional authority of
oppressed communities. The primary emphasis should be on experimenting creatively with many
potential alterations—across the legal-political and economic—and on assessing whether those
reforms would alter existing distributions of power.” My aim is to take up his call and continue
the conversation that it sparked on the IIP trip and discussed in my seminar with respect to one
reform idea in particular: an easier amendment process for our federal Constitution. In theory, an
easier amendment process could alter existing distributions of power to help achieve a thicker
democracy, but it would all depend on the mechanisms of that specific reform effort.
The alternative amendment process I will focus on is direct democracy, which includes
the initiative and referendum. The citizens’ initiative allows citizens to initiate a vote by the
electorate on a proposal outlined by those particular citizens. Our focus here is on a proposal to
amend the Constitution, but generally initiatives can relate to repealing, amending, or adopting
any law. A referendum is different than an election which is the votes by an electorate cast for
parties or candidates for public office. Instead, a referendum is a vote by the electorate directly
on an issue of public policy. It is not uncommon for initiatives and referendums to be used in
tandem in the constitutional amendment sphere to allow citizens to both initiate an amendment to
their constitution and vote in a referendum with the greater electorate on ratifying that same
amendment. This initiative plus referendum process can bypass the formal legislature completely

Renewing constitutional change is important for democracy and LPE, because “sovereignty [is] democratic only if
a people could regularly revisit its fundamental law, either to reauthorize it or to change it.” See Jedediah BrittonPurdy & David Singh Grewal, No Democracy, The Law and Political Economy Project (Jan. 08, 2018),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/no-democracy/.
5
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if it is the purest form of direct democracy. There are multiple arguments for and against the
direct democracy, which we will introduce later.
Comparative law is the study of similarities and differences between the legal systems of
different jurisdictions.6 Comparative law is the essence of the IIP trip because it exposed me to
legal systems in a different jurisdiction, Switzerland. Additionally, comparative law and LPE are
inextricably intertwined because a major goal of the LPE movement is a critical analysis of the
American economic and political system and one surefire way to critique is to compare. I will
thus use comparative law in attempting to determine what a direct democracy system for
Constitutional amendments could look like in the United States federal system. This paper will
try to anticipate the outcomes of direct democracy if utilized on the United States Constitution by
examining examples of direct democracy in Switzerland as well as amongst American states,
which drew heavy influence from Switzerland in the early 20th century.
II.

U.S. Constitutional Change
The Constitution of the United States is changed or amended both formally and

informally. The United States is a common law jurisdiction and thus the Supreme Court (and
courts generally) develop doctrines of constitutional law, which is the main informal method of
constitutional change. The federal courts impact constitutional change by determining what
constitutional issues are most important. The federal courts also determine the lens through
which to interpret those constitutional issues that it deems important. One of the only limits to
their ability to make alterations the Constitution are the requirements of Article III which
requires federal court to only hear disputes that involve “Cases” and “Controversies.”7

6
7

COMPARATIVE LAW, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
U.S. CONST. art. 3.
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The formal way to change the United States Constitution is provided in Article V.8 The
formal process has led to 27 amendments in the history of the United States constitution with the
last ratified on May 5, 1992, after pending for a record 202 years and 223 days.9 Before that you
would have to go back to the 1960s and 70s in response to the Civil Rights Movement for the
last proposed and ratified amendments. It is clear that the amending the United States
Constitution is far from an everyday occurrence. Yet, from 1789 through the 116th Congress on
January 3, 2019, there have been approximately 11,848 measures in Congress to amend the
constitution.10 The formal process, it can be said, so rarely yields amendments to the Constitution
principally because of the difficulty of the process outlined in Article V.11
Article V permits two forms of proposals and two forms of ratification processes. First,
Constitutional Amendments can be proposed with a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress.
Second, Constitutional Amendments can also be proposed during a convention of the states duly
called by Congress, but this convention process has never been used. Instead, all 33 proposed
amendments have been proposed by Congress. There have been renewed calls by a few rightwing groups to gain support for a convention of the states to propose fiscal related amendments.
However, many scholars worry that nothing in the Constitution limits the scope of changes a
convention of the states could consider and that such an event would be chaos and potentially
lead to a wholesale revision of the Constitution.12 There seems to be enough unknowns related to

8

See U.S. CONST. art. 5.
The Constitution: Amendments 11-27, National Archives (last visited Apr. 25, 2022)
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/amendments-11-27.
10
Measures Proposed to Amend the Constitution, United States Senate (last visited Apr. 25, 2022)
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/MeasuresProposedToAmendTheConstitution.htm. Even with so many measures
in Congress that has still only thirty-three amendments ever to be proposed to the states for ratification.
11
Additionally, it is common for some measures to amend the Constitution to be brought over and over again each
session of Congress, which may be inflating the ratio of failed measures to amend the constitution.
12
See David A. Super, The Hidden Threat to Our Constitution, American Constitution Society (Jun. 19, 2019)
https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-hidden-threat-to-our-constitution/
9
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a convention of the states that the only formal proposal process will continue to be through
Congress. Once Congress proposes an amendment, it must then be ratified by the states and
Article V lays out two ratification processes. Either three-fourths (or effectively 38/50) of state
legislatures must ratify the amendment or ratifying conventions in three-fourths of all states must
ratify the amendment.13
The formal amendment process is rare but constitutional law has continued the ebb and
flow of change over time. Constitutional Law scholars have accepted the idea that judicial
doctrine plays a leading role in Constitutional change.14 The problem with judicial doctrine as
the central mover in Constitutional change is that, as Rana described, judges are elites and are
not representative nor responsive to the population. Federal judges are not inherently responsive
to democracy because they are appointed with life tenure.15 Therefore, the Constitution’s
meaning is constantly adapting and changing but there is little direct accountability to the people.
Judges and courts claim to interpret the constitution rather than change the constitution.
Opinions are purposefully not explicit about the practical effect of their decision in altering the
constitutional law doctrine in an attempt to maintain justice and legitimacy of the courts.
However, when courts hide the true results of their decisions, they also become less accountable
for the changes they are actually making in Constitution.
An additional aspect of informal Constitutional change that is exacerbated by the
difficulty of formal amendment procedures is that since courts in the United States are restricted
to cases and controversies, there are elements of the Constitution that have not been litigated.
Non-litigated matters are often left for other branches of government (executive and legislative)

13

Only the 21st Amendment made use of the ratifying conventions.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Change in the United States, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE : A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro 2011)
15
See U.S. CONST. art. 3 § 1
14
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to shape Constitutional law. The problems listed above provide just a sample of reasons why the
courts as central to constitutional change may not be ideal in creating a thick democracy and why
our current Constitutional law has the potential to entrench distributions of power. The obvious
benefit of the status quo, however, is that courts have the opportunity to adapt to constitutional
challenges more quickly than the current formal amendment process. Rather than no
constitutional change because of the opposite difficulties of formal change, courts can provide
some clarity and adaptation to the existing society. We must continue to ask ourselves, as Rana
does, whether that is the preferred method of constitutional change in our democracy.
III.

Swiss Constitutional Change
Switzerland, or the Swiss Confederation, is a federal republic with just shy of 9 million in

population. The Swiss Confederation is composed of 26 cantons which are member states similar
to American states. Switzerland is known for many things including their four national
languages, banking, the Swiss Alps, but most important for this paper is the Swiss model of
direct democracy. I recently traveled to Switzerland for the first time in December of 2021 and
spoke with many Swiss legal scholars who were extremely proud of their country. A recurring
aspect that these Swiss citizens appreciated most about their country was the vast number of
initiatives and referendum that their national and sub-national governments used in
policymaking. This appreciation for direct democracy was probably second only behind how
appreciative they were to be living in such a wealthy country, of course.16
The Federal Constitution of Switzerland was first adopted in 1848. Since that time there,
have been two complete revisions to the Federal Constitution. Called Totalrevision, the complete

16

Switzerland has the highest wealth per adult of the surveyed counties including Australia, Denmark, United
States, Singapore, etc. Anthony Shorrocks et al., Global wealth databook 2021, Credit Suisse Research Institute
(June 2021)
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revisions of the constitution have been described as Foundation (1848), Expansion (1874), and
Renewal (1999).17 The first Federal Constitution was a compromise between the victorious and
defeated cantons in the Sonderbund Civil War of November 1847. The first Federal Constitution
established three governing bodies: the Federal Council, the Federal Court, and the Federal
Assembly (Parliament) which included the Council of States and National Council. The 1874
complete revision of the Federal Constitution expanded federal powers and while simultaneously
expanding fundamental rights such as economic freedoms and freedom of religion. The 1874
revision also introduced the referendum process into the federal system for the first time. The
latest complete revision in 1999 functioned as an upgrade to bring the constitution up to date
without changing the substance of the document.
Of course, not every instance of constitutional change in Switzerland is a wholesale
revision. Some revisions can be partial revisions. Between the last two complete revisions, in
1891, the right of citizens’ initiative was introduced as a partial revision to the Federal
Constitution. Additionally, the Federal Supreme Court also establishes what could be termed as
unwritten constitutional law, particularly in the domain of fundamental rights, by way of its
decisions.18 However, unlike the United States, changes in the Swiss Constitutional law take
place largely through the formal amendment procedure. In the Federal Constitution, Article 192
states that the document may be totally or partially revised at any time.19 Article 194 states that a
partial revision of the Federal Constitution may be requested by the “People or decreed by the
Federal Assembly.”20 The language referring to people is the method for popular initiative. The

17

Giovanni Biaggino, Switzerland, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE : A COMPARATIVE STUDY 303, 303-27 (Dawn
Oliver & Carlo Fusaro 2011)
18
“Unwritten” is an apt term to describe changes from the judiciary because Switzerland is a civil law jurisdiction.
19
Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 192 (Switz.)
20
Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 194 (Switz.)
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method of federal popular initiative is that 100,000 voters can make a demand for an amendment
to the Federal Constitution by signature.
Voters give their signature with respect to a specific text which will literally become the
text of the Constitution during the referendum process. With about 5 million citizens in
Switzerland’s electorate the requirement of 100,000 signatures for the popular initiative to go to
referendum represents around 2% of the total electorate.21 The popular initiative bypasses
Parliament because they only have limited responsibilities in direct democracy. One of
Parliament’s only responsibilities is to state an opinion on the content of the initiative and to
recommend that voters either approve or reject the initiative.22 An additional responsibility is to
determine whether the popular initiative is invalid, which is relatively rare. The last
responsibility is that the Federal Assembly can propose an alternative draft. The alternative draft
often happens, and the original creators of the initiative withdraw their text in favor of the one
created by the Federal Assembly. Once the popular initiative receives enough votes there is a
mandatory referendum.23 Switzerland requires a double majority for an initiative to become
binding, this is a simple majority of the voters in the referendum and a simple majority of the
Cantons. Even though many initiatives fail at referendum stage, one of the redeeming qualities of
the considerable number of popular initiatives brought to the people each year is that it signals to

21

There is an interesting analog between this percent of the electorate required to sign and the 3.5% rule. That rule
states that if that 3.5% of the population is engaged in nonviolent protest history favors the result of civil change in
line with the demands of the protest, i.e., the public overcomes political elite to achieve change. One rationale is that
the 3.5% is a small minority and such a level of active participation likely corresponds with a much large tacit
agreement. This follows the rationale for the signature requirement in the initiative process. Since most popular
initiatives in Switzerland fail at referendum, one could theorize that the 2% requirement for signatures is too low
explaining the high failure rate. See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works (2011).
22
Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 136, para. 5 (Switz.).
23
In addition to the mandatory referendum for constitutional revision, Switzerland also has optional referendum
concerning international treaties and mandatory referendum concerning accession to organizations for collective
security. See Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 140-41 (Switz.).
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the people that particular ideas are being considered on a large scale even if a majority of the
people and/or cantons do not agree with the proposed outcome.
Any description of popular sovereignty, like that which the people of Switzerland have,
requires a survey of how the people have used that power in the past. The popular initiative for
constitutional revisions has been entered into force by referendum 25 times since 1891.24 As of
writing, the latest popular initiative entered into force within the Federal Constitution is a
revision to ban advertising of tobacco products to children and young people in approved in
March of 2022. This amendment demonstrates some of the challenges and strengths of the
popular initiative. The text literally states that the Federal Assembly prohibit “any kind of
advertising of tobacco products that reaches children and young people.”25 In 2017, 27.1% of
Switzerland’s population over the age of 15 smoked including 31.7% of those aged 15-24.26 In
Switzerland, smoking is responsible for around 9,500 deaths per year. Tobacco is the greatest
preventable health risk amongst western societies and most adult smokers begin when they are
minors. So, it cannot be said that the thrust of the initiative is misguided, but the language is
clearly burdensome on advertisers and would appear to remove advertising from points of sale
requiring that any advertisement be directly targeted at adults such as via email or leaflet, which
may or may not have been the intent of the voters. Another example of a popular initiative is the
1918 initiative for proportional representation of the National Council. Proportional
representation in Switzerland replaced a majority system and requires that each political party be
represented by seats in proportion to the number of votes they receive relative to other political

24

Von Volk und Ständen angenommene Volksinitiativen, Bundeskanzlei (last modification Apr. 22, 2022)
https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_8.html. The popular initiative has been used successfully many
more times for legislation changes.
25
Bundesverfassung [BV] [Constitution] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 118, para. 2 (Switz.).
26
Faits & chiffres: tabac, Office fédéral de la santé publique (last modification Apr. 12, 2022)
https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/fr/home/zahlen-und-statistiken/zahlen-fakten-zu-sucht/zahlen-fakten-zu-tabak.html
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parties. The popular initiative of 1918 is a significant landmark in Swiss 20th century history and
points to the way direct democracy allows the people to impact the distribution of power by
altering the essence of the political system, in this case by changing how representatives are
elected. Proportional representation gave smaller political parties an opportunity to succeed in
the government. On the opposite end of the spectrum are two recent revisions from 2009 and
2021 that respectively ban construction of minarets and ban veiling in public. Both revisions
were targeted at the religious minority of Islam and cannot be described as anything more than
tyranny of the majority.
IV.

U.S. State Constitutional Change
In addition to other countries, sub-national governments within the United States practice

popular sovereignty through direct democracy. In contrast to the federal government which has
never used direct democracy in the constitution-making process, states have used direct
democracy since the colonial times.27 In the early 20th century, a movement led by populists and
progressives in response to corruption in government and the oversized influence of big business
in politics led to the increased adoption of direct democracy written into the constitutions of
many states. However, because there are 50 states each with their own constitution, direct
democracy is not universally used across states and takes different qualities in each. The
constitutional referendum, which requires states to allow citizens to vote on amendments to the
constitution, is constitutionally required and binding in 48 states.28 Additionally, there are 18
states that authorize initiatives to propose constitutional amendments.29 Interestingly, there seems
to be an evolution overtime of the subject matter of these state initiatives. Initially, proposals

27

Massachusetts was the first to use referendum to approve its state constitution.
William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 Am. J. of Comp. L. 485, 494
(2006)
29
Id. at 496
28
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focused on democratization of the political process, for example, the extension of the vote to
women and the direct election of U.S. senators. In the 70’s and 80’s, tax reform and expenditure
controls became the common initiative typified by Proposition 13 in California. And, in the 21st
century, many initiatives now focus on social issues like same-sex marriage and affirmative
action.
Oregon is important to the history of direct democracy became it is the first state to
extend the initiative and referendum process to constitutional amendments in 1902. Although,
Oregon was not the first state to add a direct democracy process to its constitution by
amendment, that honor belongs to South Dakota two years earlier, Oregon became the protype of
direct democracy around the country in the early 20th century.30 Interestingly, the Oregon
System was born out of direct democracy in Switzerland.31 Before there was direct democracy at
the Swiss federal level, some of the cantons practiced it at the local level which was discussed
approvingly by J.W. Sullivan in Direct Legislation by the Citizenship Through the Initiative and
Referendum. This book was then circulated amongst a political party known as the “Milwaukie
Alliance” that would be influential in adding direct democracy to Oregon’s constitutional law.32
Oregon is exception amongst American states because, similar to Switzerland, it requires
just a simple majority of voters to pass a constitutional amendment.33 Between 1902 and 2016,
Oregon has passed 130 of the 375 initiative measures placed on the ballot.34 In 1909, the

30

Paula Abrams, The Majority Will: A Case Study of Misinformation, Manipulation, and the Oregon Initiative
Process, 87 OR. L. REV. 1025 (2008).
31
David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon U'Ren and the Oregon
System, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 947, 950 (1994).
32
Id.
33
OR. CONST. art. XVII; Switzerland famously requires an additional simple majority vote from cantons, so
Oregon could be said to be promoting more popular sovereignty of individuals than Switzerland.
34
This number includes initiatives to amend statutes. SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK,
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (2016), https://sos.oregon.gov/bluebook/Documents/elections/initiative.pdf.
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citizens’ initiative amended the constitution to create proportional representation, while it took
until 1912 to pass an equal suffrage initiative.35 Many of these early progressive victories were,
according to scholars, “a product of its particular historical context” but the state’s population is
no longer homogenous and no longer believes politics is the pursuit of the general good.36 While
the founding era popular sovereignty increased participation by expanding the electorate to
include previously disenfranchised groups, it is now believed that initiatives use has been to
“disempower, to marginalize, [and] to create an economic and political elite.”37 Although
Oregon was the first, and has a lower bar than other states to the referendum process, it seems
Oregon also follows the same pattern of subject matter focus that was described above among
American States referendum.
V.

Negatives of Direct Democracy
Initiatives and referendum can lead to a phenomenon called tyranny of the majority

whereby majority groups in society use electorate power to restrict or hinder rights of unpopular
minority groups. This has happened in Switzerland and most recently with the banning of
minarets and full-face coverings, which was an instance of discrimination against people of
Islamic faith. Tyranny of the majority also happens here in American states. Oregon, for example
in 2004, banned same-sex marriage through a constitutional initiative and referendum.38 “Time
and again, initiatives are used to disadvantage minorities: racial minorities, language minorities,
sexual orientation minorities, political minorities” says on constitutional law scholar.39 Drawing
on his experiences in California with the proposition system, Chemerinsky highlights the dangers

35

OR. CONST. art. II, § 16; OR. CONST. art. II, § 2.
Schuman, supra note 29, at 961.
37
Id. at 962.
38
Only overturned ten years later when the state constitutional amendment was found to violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. See Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014).
39
Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. St. L. REV. 293, 294 (2007).
36
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of majoritarian direct democracy while also progressing the argument that direct democracy is
inconsistent with the structure of the constitution.
Referendums and initiatives undermine the role and importance of elected representatives
and thus undermine a key constitutional foundation, the system of representative democracy.
This might be exemplified most by the subjective feelings of the Swiss electorate to elections.
Swiss citizens have many opportunities to vote on a host of issues in referendum, but that means
elections are less important in Switzerland. The perceived lower importance of electing
representatives in Switzerland results in Switzerland having some of the lowest voter turnout in
the world at 45% in 2019.40 Whether implementing direct democracy would irreparably damage
the structure of the Constitution or not, it is clear that direct democracy would undermine
representative democracy just as representative democracy would undermine direct democracy.
This tradeoff could be viewed as a major negative result of direct democracy.
Dangers of direct democracy, it is feared, are compounded when brought into the
constitutional law setting like we are discussing in this paper. Ginsburg notes that “nearly all the
normative and positive work on constitutions proceeds from the assumption that constitutional
politics are fundamentally different in character from ordinary politics.”41 Many scholars agree
that the Constitution should be relatively fixed and not subject to ordinary politics. Easier change
could compromise our long-term commitments for our short-term actions. The long-term

40

André Blais, Why is Turnout So Low in Switzerland? Comparing the Attitudes of Swiss and German Citizens
Towards Electoral Democracy, 4 Swiss Political Science Review 520, 520 (2014) (noting that in addition to
perceived lack of importance of elections, voter fatigue and election complexity could be additional factors causing
the lower voter turnout in Switzerland); Switzerland, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/521/76/ctr.
41
Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci. 1 (2009)
(discussing constitution process in designing a constitution, however, the idea is applicable to the amendment
process as well).
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commitment of the Constitution is one of a representative democracy, and one that aims to
protect minorities more than anything else.42
Another common concern with direct democracy is that it leads to faulty lawmaking, to
which there are numerous explanations. One explanation is that voters do not have the capacity
or information to make the correct decision about the issue in question. Especially in the realm of
constitutional law, voters can be unfamiliar with the complex issues at play, resulting in poor
law. Another explanation relates to initiatives specifically because initiatives can result in poorly
drafted law. The wording as proposed in initiative is the wording that becomes law if it is passed
in referendum. Government lawyers and officials familiar with our Constitution are more likely
to provide expertise central to the drafting process.43 Finally, there may be faulty lawmaking
because often referendums take the form of yes-no voting. This type of voting can lead to results
that do not align with the true preferences of the voter, which legislatures may be able to better
achieve through negotiation.44
Adversaries of direct democracy also point to the problem finances play in the political
process, a problem that is exacerbated in direct democracy. Initiatives are usually only available
to well-resourced organizations and interests. This means that the initiative process will be
overwhelmingly used by special interest groups for their own purposes, rather for producing
good democratic laws. Referendums are also at risk of being bought by special interest groups
that can mislead average voters who are not scrupulous.
VI.

42

Positives of Direct Democracy

That is true even if the minorities that the Constitution originally sought to protect were wealthy, land-owning
minorities. Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 294.
43
This explanation was demonstrated by Switzerland’s most recent Federal Constitution initiative about tobacco
advertising that was described above.
44
Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, A Problem with Referendums, 12 Journal of Theoretical Politics 5 (2000)
(“Legislatures facilitate sequential voting and vote-trading better than referendums, suggesting that referendums
increase the quantity of participants in democratic decision-making but decrease the quality of participation.”).
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According to the Democracy Index 2021, political culture remains the United States’
weakest democratic category. 45 As a result of social cohesion and consensus collapsing
provoked by a highly politicized media that amplify the divide, the culture in American politics
today is tumultuous at best. The United States is not even considered a full democracy, but
instead a flawed democracy, which is to say, a democracy with free and fair elections yet
significant weaknesses in other aspects of the democracy.46 The troubled political culture is why
Rana’s critiques of status quo are so relevant right now. Adding aspects of direct democracy into
America’s constitutional decision making could potentially be a solution to these current
challenges. Switzerland, who is amongst the top ten countries in the Democracy Index, are tied
for the third best political culture behind a pair of Nordic countries. It is possible that direct
democracy aspects of Swiss constitutional law are the reason there is such a large deviation
between the United States and Switzerland.
Evidence from studies between Swiss cantons, which provide a good opportunity to
assess the influence of direct democracy because of their multiple variations in formal direct
democracy, shows that direct democracy at least increases the satisfaction with democracy, if it
is used.47 Although there are mixed findings, some studies have shown that there is a greater
subjective well-being in populations with stronger direct democratic rights.48 It seems, based on
the empirical research, that worst case scenario a population would be more accepting of
democracy and best case they would be happier. Additionally, past studies have found that direct
democracy has the potential to increase knowledge and interest in democracy, which can also

45

Democracy Index 2021, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited at 56.
Democracy Index 2021, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited at 68.
47
Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen & Adrian Vatter, Does Satisfaction with Democracy Really Increase Happiness?
Direct Democracy and Individual Satisfaction in Switzerland, 34 Polit. Behav. 535, 552 (2011)
48
Bruno Frey et al, Outcome, process and power in direct democracy, 107 Public Choice 271 (2001).
46

De Ycaza 16

improve the functioning of democracy.49 But, participation of citizens in the democratic process
is not just valuable by itself, but it should also promote positive attitudes toward the political
system, improving the overall political culture. While traveling in Switzerland with the
University of Chicago IIP, I spoke with Swiss Constitutional Law scholars about issues like
Switzerland’s direct democracy process leading to discrimination against the practices of Islamic
faith to be inserted in their Federal Constitution. There was widespread disapproval of the
measures, but one difference I noticed is that there was not the same sense of hopelessness in
their politics as there is in the United States. Instead, these scholars I spoke with believed they
had the opportunity to right their wrong.
Besides providing a solution to political culture, one of America’s most pressing issues,
other positive benefits have been proposed to stem from direct democracy. Take, for example,
another issue in federal politics today: the wealth gap. Empirical research gives some indication
that direct democracies are more efficient in reducing income inequality, even though direct
democracy is less likely to spend on welfare.50 Another positive result of direct democracies is
the potential to remedy inequality. Given that every citizen acts as a policy-marker in a direct
democracy there is a greater policy making capacity for women, who have been historically
underrepresented in American politics. Women vote differently than men, including more
approval for increased government and less approval for military spending, which could lead to
more democratic policy decision.51 Direct democracy could also provide equality to millions of
people living in large states who have less political power because in the current United States
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system, smaller, less populous states have outsized power when it comes to Constitutional
amendments. Finally, legislatures are more likely to be accountable in enacting reform policies
in a world where they have to contend with the possibility of a constitutional initiative and
referendum. Direct democracy. Direct Democracy appears to have the potential to help decrease
voter apathy and disenchantment and re-engage the American voters with politics and
democracy.
VII.

Recommendations for United States
Aspects of direct democracy could theoretically be accomplished in the present United

States Constitutional amendment process by one of two ways. First, and difficult to imagine, a
Constitutional amendment would have to be passed in the traditional formal amendment system
providing for an additional formal amendment process including aspects of direct democracy like
initiative and referendum. Second, and potentially foreclosed already, would be to have states
decide to provide in their own law the power to ratify an amendment by referendum.
In Hawke v. Smith, the Supreme Court unanimously held that states were not free to
adopt provisions to allow their legislatures’ action on a Constitutional amendment to be reversed
through popular votes since the power was granted explicitely to the legislatures by the
Constitution.52 The Constitution did not provide for any role to be played by the People in
proposing or ratifying amendments to the constitution. However, most recently in Arizona State
Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court had a different
interpretation of the term legislature.53 According to the majority, “…it would be perverse to
interpret the term ‘Legislature’ in the Elections Clause so as to exclude lawmaking by the
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people….”54 This raises the question of how the Court might come out if they were to revisit
Hawke v. Smith, even though Ginsburg writes that in the context of ratifying amendments “’The
Legislature’ has a different identity.”55
So, the United States is likely never going adopt Switzerland’s federal form of direct
democracy for constitutional amendments because of our current Constitutional constraints, but
it is also still undecided whether direct democracy would be a net positive for the United States.
There is disagreement amongst legal theorists, economist, and political scientists alike about the
virtues and failings of direct democracy. One reason for such disagreement is that direct
democracy takes many forms.
Rather than a full blown—completely subverting representative democracy—initiative
and referendum process for constitutional amendments, there are many intermediate possibilities
as well. Firstly, any referendum process proposed in the United States federal system would have
to take into consideration the dual sovereignty of the people as a whole and the states. In
Switzerland, the referendum requires a simple majority of the people and the cantons, which is
referred to as a double majority. State sovereignty would have to be included in the referendum
process in America too given our history. Other important aspects of a direct democracy system
include how often the initiative has to be voted on to be approved, how often an initiative can be
raised if it is voted down, how many subjects can be on one referendum, whether the referendum
will allow for multi-option ballots, what the minimum voter turnout is for referendum and
minimum signature for initiatives, whether there will be opportunities to amend the proposal or
for counter-proposals, and the timing of when the referendum occurs.56 Many different nations
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and sub-national governments have a mix of these aspects and others in their direct democracy,
which goes to show how determining the extent of positive and negative outcomes of direct
democracy in general is so hotly debated and doesn’t lend itself easily to empirical research.
After surveying the research and theories, as well as looking at some of the most directly
democratic jurisdictions with Oregon and Switzerland, the best solution for immediate change in
the United States would be to have Congress pass a law to allow for an optional non-binding,
advisory referendum. The procedure would allow Congress to present certain measures for
constitutional amendments in federal election as referendum that would demonstrate the will of
the electorate and engage the electorate, yet not violate the constitution. This would simply be a
participatory apparatus rather than having any legal force. The benefits of an optional and nonbinding referendum are that the United States could allow for multiple circumstances for
deciding to do the referendum. For example, less than a majority of the legislature could call the
referendum or the president could call the referendum, which would increase the chances that the
referendum took place and the more referendum the better. More referendum could be a
steppingstone for mandatory referenda in the future if it is successful. The benefits of this
process being advisory and non-binding is that it will give the electorate more opportunity to
engage in a formal political showing while protecting the representative democracy outlined in
our Constitution. Allowing for a formal way to determine how the electorate would end up on
any issue of proposed Constitutional amendment would also help engage voters and could
potentially improve America’s political culture. Finally, its non-binding nature could lead to
Congress formally proposing more amendments for ratification since the vote to propose the
amendment would be less politically risky if it is clearly seen as the will of the people.
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VIII. Conclusion
Let us not deceive ourselves, direct democracy in the United States Constitution is not
currently possible, bar some amendment or revision to the Constitution which would require the
Supreme Court to overrule precedent or the formal Constitutional amendment process to be
successful. Nevertheless, it is an interesting thought experiment to imagine whether the United
States could benefit by adopting a system of direct democracy in its federal Constitutional
system. Given the challenges presented by direct democracy in Switzerland and in Oregon, I am
left unsure whether direct democracy alone would be enough to alter existing distributions of
power in a positive way. Some form of non-binding direct democracy measure, though a small
step, may just be enough to introduce a new type of engagement into the American electorate
that is truly the type of spark needed today to rebuild a thicker democracy.

